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ABA Business Law Section, on behalf of its committees on LLCs and
Nonprofit Organizations, opposes legislation for low profit limited liability
companies (L3Cs)
Abstract
This document comprises a letter and attachment “submitted by the ABA Business Law Section on behalf of
its Committee on Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Entities and its Committee
on Nonprofit Organizations … and states our views on … a bill ‘relating to limited liability companies [and]
providing for the creation and operation of low-profit limited liability companies.’” The letter and attachment
“have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar
Association and should not be construed as representing the policy of the ABA.”
Supported by detailed analysis of both tax and LLC law, the letter makes the following major points:
• The L3C is no better than any other business form for receiving program related investments from
private foundations. L3C legislation implies otherwise and we believe is therefore misleading.
• Using a program related investment as part of the type of tranched financing promoted by L3C
advocates portends serious risk of improper “private benefit” – i.e., using charitable assets to the benefit
of private interests such as for-profit investors. “Private benefit” transactions are improper for a private
foundation and imperil a foundation’s tax-exempt status. A private foundation cannot remain qualified
as a tax-exempt charitable entity if the foundation has transgressed the private benefit doctrine.
• In addition:
◦ enacting L3C legislation inadvertently but dangerously signals that state law can streamline and
simplify compliance with federal tax law requirements and that program related investments can
be accomplished simply, quickly, and almost “off the rack;”
◦ it is inappropriate and unnecessary to use state entity law to provide a new and potentially
misleading “brand” to mark private business ventures as socially beneficial;
◦ the L3C legislation contains a technical flaw that renders the legislation self-defeating in most
instances; and
◦ current LLC law already permits the type of ventures contemplated by the L3C legislation.
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April 19, 2012 
 
The Honorable Steve Simon 
Assistant Minority Leader 
Minnesota House of Representatives 
279 State Office Building 
100 Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd 
Minneapolis, MN 55155-1298 
 
Re:  House File No. 2702 – Low Profit Limited Liability Companies (L3C) 
 
Dear Representative Simon: 
 
This letter is submitted by the ABA Business Law Section on behalf of its Committee on 
Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Entities and its 
Committee on Nonprofit Organizations (“the Committees”) and states our views on House 
File No. 2702, a bill “relating to limited liability companies [and] providing for the 
creation and operation of low-profit limited liability companies.” (“the L3C legislation” or 
“the legislation”).  Attachment A explains our views in detail.  This letter and Attachment 
A have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the 
American Bar Association and should not be construed as representing the policy of the 
ABA. 
 
We recognize that many people of good will are seeking methods to increase the flow of 
capital to socially beneficial business enterprises. As part of that effort, the proponents of 
L3Cs argue that the L3C provides a new vehicle to increase that capital flow: 
 
 by facilitating the leveraging of federal tax benefits, 
 
 through obtaining funds in the form of  tax-favored, program related 
investments (“PRIs”), 
 
 from heavily regulated charitable private foundations whose assets are 
obtained and maintained under the aegis of federal tax benefits. 
 
We have carefully studied the L3C legislation and relevant federal tax law and have 
concluded that, under current federal tax law: 
 
The L3C is no better than any other business form for receiving program 
related investments from private foundations. L3C legislation implies 
otherwise and we believe is therefore misleading. 
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Using a program related investment as part of the type of tranched 
financing promoted by L3C advocates portends serious risk of improper 
“private benefit” – i.e., using charitable assets to the benefit of private 
interests such as for-profit investors.  “Private benefit” transactions are 
improper for a private foundation and imperil a foundation’s tax-exempt 
status.  A private foundation cannot remain qualified as a tax-exempt 
charitable entity if the foundation has transgressed the private benefit 
doctrine. 
 
L3C legislation is completely ineffective in providing advantages over any other legal 
form of business organization in obtaining PRIs, and is, moreover, at odds with precisely 
those aspects of the federal tax law which the L3C legislation seeks to invoke.   
 
L3C advocates heavily promote a particular type of “tranched investment” structure as a 
core benefit of the L3Cs,1 but this structure is dangerous for any private foundation.  In 
the tranched investment structure promoted by L3C advocates, a private foundation makes 
a high-risk/low-return investment, which enables the recipient organization to offer 
attractive terms to one or more other “tranches” of for-profit investors.  Although the 
recipient organization may itself have socially beneficial purposes, by definition one of its 
purposes is to provide profit for the for-profit investors (including above market rates for 
the top “tranche” of investors).  
 
Thus, the tranched investment structure commingles assets from private foundations with 
capital investments from private profit seekers and inevitably uses charitable assets to 
confer “private benefit” on the for-profit investors in the recipient organization.  If, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, those benefits are not merely incidental to furthering 
exempt (i.e., charitable) purposes, the risk to the investing private foundation is extreme – 
i.e., loss of its tax exempt status. 
 
The same concerns would exist if an ordinary limited liability company (“LLC”) or a for-
profit corporation were to deploy private foundation funds in a tranched investment 
structure.  The special danger of L3C legislation is that enactment gives a misleading 
state-government imprimatur to a structure that: (i) does nothing distinctively beneficial to 
accomplish its purported goals; and (ii) to the contrary, may mislead unsophisticated 
people of good will into significant federal tax problems.  The tranched investment 
structure is apt to be promoted as having been approved by any state legislature that 
adopts L3C legislation.   
 
In addition, we note that: (i) enacting L3C legislation inadvertently but dangerously 
signals that state law can streamline and simplify compliance with federal tax law 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Americans for Community Development, “What is an L3C?”  at 
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/What%20is%20the%20L3C-
101010.pdf  (last visited June 27, 2011) (“The L3C facilitates PRI investment without the need for 
IRS private letter rulings. It also facilitates tranched investing with the PRI usually taking first risk 
position thereby taking much of the risk out of the venture for other investors in lower tranches. 
The rest of the investment levels or tranches become more attractive to commercial investment by 
improving the credit rating and thereby lowering the cost of capital. It is particularly favorable to 
equity investment. Because the foundations take the highest risk at little or no return, it essentially 
turns the venture capital model on its head and gives many social enterprises a low enough cost of 
capital that they are able to be self sustainable.”) 
requirements and that program related investments can be accomplished simply, quickly, 
and almost “off the rack;” (ii) it is inappropriate  and unnecessary to use state entity law to 
provide a new and potentially misleading “brand” to mark private business ventures as 
socially beneficial; (iii) the L3C legislation contains a technical flaw that renders the 
legislation self defeating in most instances; and (iv) current LLC law already permits the 
type of ventures contemplated by the L3C legislation. 
 
For all these reasons, we respectfully urge you to oppose House File No. 2702.  
 
On behalf of the Section and our Committees, thank you for considering our views on 
these important issues.  If we can provide any further information (including testimony), 
please contact Scott Ludwig, Chair of our Committee on Limited Liability Companies, 
Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities at sludwig@babc.com or (256) 517-5149  or 
Michael Malamut, Chair of our Committee on Nonprofit Organizations at 
michael@michaelmalamut.com or (781) 329-9096. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
Linda J. Rusch 
Chair, ABA Business Law Section 
 
cc: Scott Ludwig, Esq. 
 Michael Malamut, Esq. 
Thomas M. Susman, Director, ABA Governmental Affairs Office 
R. Larson Frisby, Associate Director, ABA Governmental Affairs Office 
Alpha M. Brady, Director, ABA Policy Administration Division 
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I. General Background – LLCs and L3Cs 
 
Over the past 25 years, the LLC has become the dominant form of legal entity for business 
organizations whose ownership interests are not publicly traded.  For example, last year in 
Minnesota, 5965 new corporations were incorporated, while 24,923 new LLCs were 
organized.2 
 
L3C legislation seeks to establish a special form of LLC, known as the low profit limited 
liability company (“L3C”).  Typical L3C legislation provides that an LLC designated as 
an L3C must: (1) significantly further a charitable purpose; (2) have no significant 
purpose of producing income or the appreciation of property; and (3) not engage in 
lobbying.3 
 
L3C advocates assert that the L3C will further socially constructive goals by facilitating 
cooperation between non-profit and for-profit enterprises – in particular by encouraging 
private foundations to invest charitable funds in L3Cs which will leverage those funds to 
attract for-profit capital investments or otherwise provide financial support to a business 
enterprise with for profit owners.  The fulcrum of the L3C concept is a component of 
federal tax law – the program related investment (PRI). 
 
The leverage advocated for the L3C is a particular type of tranched investing – an 
arrangement in which a private foundation makes a high-risk/low-return investment, 
which enables the recipient organization to offer attractive terms or otherwise provide 
investment enhancement to one or more other “tranches” of for-profit investors.  L3C 
advocates assert that this combination of capital enables the socially beneficial enterprise 
to pursue both self-sufficiency and the enterprise’s social goals. 
 
 
II. Tax-Based Strictures on Private Foundations – In General 
 
Private foundations enjoy tax-exempt status.4  In return, they face comprehensive and 
complex tax requirements designed to: (i) preclude diversion of charitable assets to non-
charitable purposes or private persons;5  (ii) deter investment of charitable assets that 
might jeopardize a foundation’s charitable purpose;6  (iii) require each foundation 
annually to make a specified minimum distribution in furtherance of the foundation’s 
charitable purpose;7 and (iv) permit the required minimum amount to be met, in part or in 
                                                          
2 Source:  spreadsheet provided April 2, 2012 by the Office of the Secretary of State of Minnesota.inser  
3 L3C statutes also typically provide that the production of significant income or appreciation is not itself 
conclusive of a purpose to do so.  In other words, if the LLC makes a great profit, disqualification 
under the state definition does not result automatically. 
4 IRC § 501(a). 
5 See the authorities cited in note 8.  
6 Treas. Reg § 53.4944-1. 
7 IRC § 4942. 
whole, through tightly controlled and carefully considered investments in for-profit 
enterprises when the investment is designed to further the investing foundation’s 
charitable purpose.8 
 
For the purposes of making a tax-based analysis of L3Cs and tranched investing, the 
following concepts are the most important: (i) private benefit; (ii) jeopardizing 
investments; (iii) PRIs; and (iv) expenditure responsibility. 
 
With regard to each of these concepts, the L3C provides no special benefit whatsoever.  
With regard to several of these concepts, tranched investing can be dangerous or fatal to a 
private foundation’s tax exempt status.  In all events, PRIs always require careful of 
planning and design plan specially tailored to the charitable purpose of the investing 
foundation. 
 
 
III. The Prohibition of Private Benefit 
 
A. In General 
 
A prohibition on non-incidental “private benefit” overarches every aspect of a private 
foundation’s operations and programs. 
 
After extensive hearings in 1969, Congress singled out "private foundations" 
from the tax-exempt population and subjected them to a series of intricate 
restrictions of unprecedented severity, which are buttressed by extensive 
reporting requirements…. [T]he underlying policy apparently is that additional 
regulation of foundations is required to ensure that their income and assets are 
not used inconsistently with the basic premise of the charitable deductions and 
exemption--that the deducted and exempted amounts should be used for public 
rather than private benefit.9 
 
Private benefit is prohibited unless merely incidental to furthering the foundation’s 
exempt purposes.10 A private foundation that breaks the rule against private benefit risks a 
draconian penalty - loss of the foundation’s tax-exempt status.11   
                                                          
8 §53.4942(a)-3(a)(2)(i). 
9 Boris I. Bittker and Lawrence Lokken , Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, § 101.1 (available 
at 1997 WL 440016 (W.G.&.L.) (current through 2011 
10 Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 US 279, 283 (1945) (“[T]he presence of a single non-
[exempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or 
importance of truly [exempt] purposes.’).  Universal Church of Jesus Christ, Inc. v. C.I.R. 
T.C. Memo. 1988-65, 1988 WL 12612 (1988) (“The regulations under section 501(c)(3) not only 
require an organization to be operated for one or more exempt purposes, but require that 
organization to be ‘operated exclusively‘ for such purposes. Sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), Income Tax 
Regs. However, ‘An organization which engages in nonexempt activities can obtain and maintain 
exempt status so long as such activities are only incidental and less than substantial.’ Church in 
Boston v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 102, 107 (1978).”).  See also United Cancer Council, Inc. v. 
Comm'r, 165 F3d 1173, 1179-1180 (1999) (Posner, J.) (“The usual ‘private benefit’ case is one in 
 
B. Private Benefit and the L3C 
 
Any comingling of for-profit goals and charitable assets inevitably raises the specter of 
improper private benefit.  Despite claims to the contrary, the L3C structure contains no 
“magic bullet” for this problem.  To the contrary, nothing in the L3C structure prevents 
private benefit.  An L3C is a low profit limited liability company, not a “no profit” limited 
liability company.  Moreover, the L3C legislation does not prevent an L3C from shucking 
its L3C status and becoming a “profit above all” LLC. 
 
An L3C operating agreement can be structured to avoid that transformation, but the 
operating agreement of an ordinary LLC can do likewise – even to the extent of granting a 
non-member a veto right over any change in the socially beneficial mission of the LLC.12 
 
In any event, the mixing of for-profit (even low profit) motives with charitable purposes 
requires nuanced thinking, thoughtful planning, and expert professional advice.  When 
private benefit is possible, the stakes are very high.  A private foundation that transgresses 
the prohibition on private benefit risks its very existence as an exempt organization. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
which the charity has dual public and private goals … and … the board of a charity has a duty of 
care, just like the board of an ordinary business corporation and a violation of that duty which 
involved the dissipation of the charity's assets might support a finding that the charity was 
conferring a private benefit, even if the contracting party did not control, or exercise undue 
influence over, the charity.”).  See also Boris I. Bittker and Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of 
Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶ 100.4 INUREMENT OF EARNINGS TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, 
1997 WL 440011 (footnotes omitted) (“The IRS has, in recent years, given increased attention to 
compensation arrangements between exempt hospitals and physicians. For example, in 1992, it 
noted that some hospitals claiming exemption under § 501(c)(3) ‘have formed joint ventures with 
members of their medical staff and sold to the joint venture the gross or net revenue stream derived 
from the operation of an existing hospital department or service for a defined period of time.’ Such 
an arrangement jeopardizes the exemption, according to the IRS, because it ‘causes the hospital's 
net earnings to inure to the benefit of private individuals (the physician investors),’ the “private 
benefit flowing from the transaction ‘cannot be considered incidental to the public benefits 
received,’ and the arrangement may violate federal law.”). 
11 IRC §§ 4941-4945. 
12 See e.g. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (“Re-ULLCA”), § 112(a) (“An operating 
agreement may specify that its amendment requires the approval of a person that is not a party to 
the operating agreement or the satisfaction of a condition.  An amendment is ineffective if its 
adoption does not include the required approval or satisfy the specified condition.”); Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (“A limited liability company agreement may provide rights to any person, 
including a person who is not a party to the limited liability company agreement, to the extent set 
forth therein.”).  Neither Re-ULLCA nor the Delaware LLC Act require an ordinary LLC to have a 
for-profit purpose. Re-ULLCA, § 104(b) (“A limited liability company may have any lawful 
purpose, regardless of whether for profit.”); Del. Code Ann., tit. 6, § 18-106(a) (providing that “[a] 
limited liability company may carry on any lawful business, purpose or activity, whether or not for 
profit”). Even under an LLC statute that requires a business purpose, that requirement does not 
prevent LLC owners from agreeing to mix social benefits with their business or from agreeing to 
operate their business in a socially beneficial way. 
Thus, the notion that the L3C is superior to the LLC in dealing with the issue of private 
benefit is unfounded and misleading.  Whatever type of organization is used, there is no 
quick fix and no simple way out.  “Off the rack” solutions are recipes for disaster. 
 
 
C. Private Benefit, the L3C, and Tranched Investing 
 
As extolled by L3C proponents, the tranched investment mechanism is a multiple-tiered 
investment strategy under which the foundation makes an investment in an L3C with the 
highest risk and lowest return. This capital permits an L3C to leverage the foundation’s 
investment to attract other investors for other investment tiers at a lower risk and higher 
return.13  
                                                          
13 E.g., The Florida Senate Committee on Commerce, An Overview Of Low-Profit Limited Liability 
Companies (L3Cs), Issue Brief 2011-210 (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/InterimReports/2011/2011-210cm.pdf (“Ideally, the structure 
of an L3C allows for three tranches of investment; the equity tranche, the mezzanine tranche, and 
the senior tranche. The first level of investment, the equity tranche or junior tranche, consists of 
investors that seek little or no returns on their contribution. For L3Cs, equity tranche investors are 
likely to be private foundations making program related investments (PRIs) as they are prohibited 
by federal regulations from contemplating a financial return as their motive for investment. Once 
this initial equity investment is made in the L3C, it absorbs most of the financial investment risk, 
making the L3C a more attractive investment for the mezzanine tranche of investors…. Senior 
tranche, or third tier, investments are provided by investors that seek market-rate returns. These 
types of investors are likely to make investments with guaranteed returns or returns that are keyed 
to the L3C’s profits, which is possible given that the equity tranche and mezzanine tranche of 
investments take on most of the financial risk.”); S3011-2011: Relates to establishing the L3C act 
regarding low-profit limited liability companies, http://m.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S3011-2011 
(“It is also envisioned to facilitate tranched investing by foundations, with a PRI taking the first 
risk position and thereby taking much of the risk out of the venture for other investors in lower 
tranches.”).  See also Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, “Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate 
Social Responsibility?” 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1363-64 (2011) (“Proponents of the L3C 
form envision that its controllers can leverage these program-related investments with private 
capital to achieve its social aims, which would also serve the investing foundation's purposes. On 
this model, investments in L3Cs would be structured in tranches: program-related investments 
would ideally take the riskiest position in the capital structure and receive no or lower returns, 
thereby lowering risk and increasing returns for other equity investors. The top tranche might be at 
the risk-adjusted market rate of return. There might also be a “mezzanine” tranche, designed for 
investors willing to accept a lower return because of their contribution to social welfare.”); David 
Shevlin & Jennifer Maimone-Medwick, “Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies (‘L3CS’): A 
Fact Sheet,” SS019 ALI-ABA 179, 181 (2010) (“The ability to tranche the stake of the various 
investors allows for uneven allocation of risk and reward among investors could open up additional 
streams of capital, both from private foundations … and from individuals. For example, a private 
foundation could make an investment in a junior tranche, absorbing excess risk and receiving 
below market returns, and a more senior tranche could be offered to attract additional capital from 
non-charitable investors that could generate a market rate of return, while investing in projects that 
provide tangible social benefits. The market rate of return can be offered due to the lower rate of 
return obligations on the private foundation's investment.”); Elizabeth Schmidt, “Vermont’s Social 
Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and Questions To Ponder,” 35 VT. L. REV. 163, 169 (2010) 
(“The L3C creators reasoned that a private foundation would make the initial investment in an L3C 
through a PRI. That investment would be the investment with the highest risk and the lowest rate of 
return. It would provide the initial equity capital to the L3C, which would then give the L3C 
sufficient capital to attract investors who would otherwise have found the investment too risky. 
Such investors would then become a part of a separate membership class (or tranche) in the 
L3C, a class that could expect a higher rate of return than the foundation did. This 
 
There is absolutely nothing special about an L3C to make possible a tranched 
investment arrangement.  Indeed, the federal tax ruling closest in concept (although not 
involving tranched investing) was a private letter ruling involving a private foundation 
investment in an ordinary LLC.14 
 
As promoted by L3C advocates, tranched investing purposefully uses foundation funds 
to subsidize (and thereby attract) private, profit-seeking investors.  The principal goal 
may be laudable but the means – using charitable funds to enrich “top tranche” 
investors – portends serious risk of private benefit.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
class might become a middle tranche of investors, those who still accept a below 
market rate of return in order to encourage a social return. Ultimately, a class of 
investors who expect a market rate of return could emerge. Thus, the PRI would 
not only provide capital; it would also leverage additional investment.”); Americans for 
Community Development, “The Concept of the L3C,” 
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/concept.php, last visited 7/24/11 (“The L3C 
facilitates tranching or layering. The keys to an L3C's operation is its use of low-cost foundation 
capital in a high risk tranche of its structure and its ability to allocate risk and reward unevenly over 
a number of investors, thus ensuring some a very safe investment with market return. As is 
appropriate under the PRI structure, foundations would normally be expected to assume the highest 
risk at very low return, making the rest of the investment far more secure.”).  The same strategy 
could be pursued with an ordinary LLC or even a for-profit corporation.  However, the strategy is 
promoted in relationship to L3Cs. 
14 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 10, 2006). 
15 Compare this type of private benefit with the situation described in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 
10, 2006).  The ruling letter described an arrangement in which: (i) the private foundation and the 
other LLCs members shared risk and return equally; and (ii) the other members were investing not 
only to lend their personal, sports-based prestige the project’s goal of “investing in businesses in 
low-income communities owned or controlled by members of a minority or other disadvantaged 
group” but also to receive mandatory training in how to use their wealth through “angel investing 
and entrepreneurship.” See also the authorities cited in note 8 and  Boris I. Bittker and Lawrence 
Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶ 100.4 (Inurement of Earnings of Private 
Individuals), 1997 WL 440011.   In ¶ 100.4 of their treatise, Bittker and Lokken discuss the private 
benefit resulting from a different arrangement for intertwining non-profit and for-profit activity:  
“The IRS has, in recent years, given increased attention to compensation arrangements between 
exempt hospitals and physicians. For example, in 1992, it noted that some hospitals claiming 
exemption under § 501(c)(3) ‘have formed joint ventures with members of their medical staff and 
sold to the joint venture the gross or net revenue stream derived from the operation of an existing 
hospital department or service for a defined period of time.’ Such an arrangement jeopardizes the 
exemption, according to the IRS, because it ‘causes the hospital's net earnings to inure to the 
benefit of private individuals (the physician investors),’ the “private benefit flowing from the 
transaction ‘cannot be considered incidental to the public benefits received,’ and the arrangement 
may violate federal law.’”) (footnotes omitted).    
IV. Jeopardizing Investments 
 
A. In General 
 
Tax law uses the concept of “jeopardizing investments” to channel private foundations 
and their managers toward careful, mission-oriented investments.16  “If a private 
foundation invests any amount in such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any 
of its exempt purposes,” both the foundation and its managers face substantial excise 
taxes.17  
 
Program related investments (PRIs), discussed below, are exempt from the jeopardizing 
investment analysis.18  For all other investments by private foundations, the following 
standard applies: 
 
[A]n investment shall be considered to jeopardize the carrying out of the 
exempt purposes of a private foundation if it is determined that the 
foundation managers, in making such investment, have failed to exercise 
ordinary business care and prudence, under the facts and circumstances 
prevailing at the time of making the investment, in providing for the long- 
and short-term financial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt 
purposes. 19 
 
The rule’s purpose is to safeguard each foundation’s financial ability to purpose its 
charitable purpose, and the focus is largely financial:  
 
In the exercise of the requisite standard of care and prudence the 
foundation managers may take into account the expected return (including 
both income and appreciation of capital), the risks of rising and falling 
price levels, and the need for diversification within the investment portfolio 
(for example, with respect to type of security, type of industry, maturity of 
company, degree of risk and potential for return). The determination 
whether the investment of a particular amount jeopardizes the carrying out 
of the exempt purposes of a foundation shall be made on an investment by 
investment basis, in each case taking into account the foundation's portfolio 
as a whole.20 
 
 
                                                          
16 IRC § 4944(a)(1); Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4944-1 and 53.4944-2 
17 IRC § 4944(a) and (b). 
18 IRC § 4944(c). 
19 Treas. Reg § 53.4944-1(a)(2).  Even a mission oriented investment might be jeopardizing if  the risks were 
high and the investment comprised an imprudently large proportion of the foundation’s assets. 
20 Id. 
B. Jeopardizing Investments and the L3C 
 
A private foundation’s investment in a L3C is not automatically a jeopardizing 
investment.  As explained below, a valid PRI is not a jeopardizing investment, and 
“[n]o category of investments shall be treated as a per se violation of section 4944 
[the jeopardizing investment rule].”21 
 
However, in general, investment in an L3C poses greater risk than investment in a 
for-profit enterprise and portends lower returns.  Almost by definition, L3Cs 
intentionally seek opportunities unattractive to investors driven “merely” by the 
calculus of profit and loss.22  Thus, it could hardly be the “exercise [of] ordinary 
business care and prudence” for a private foundation to commit a substantial 
portion of its assets to an L3C. 
 
Moreover, state legislation can do nothing to affect the “investment by 
investment” determination required of a private foundation and its managers.  
“[No] … State law [may] exempt or relieve any person from any obligation, 
duty, responsibility, or other standard of conduct provided in section 4944 and 
the regulations thereunder.”23 
 
C. Jeopardizing Investments, the L3C, and Tranched Investing 
 
Tranched investing, in the form advocated by L3C proponents, can significantly 
increase a private foundation’s risk of making a jeopardizing investment, 
especially for foundations with limited assets.  In that particular tranched 
investing structure, the private foundation is a high risk/low return investor – 
precisely the opposite of what a careful investor typically seeks.   
 
                                                          
21 Id. 
22 Put another way:  if careful investors consider a particular venture to be a worthwhile investment, the 
market will fund the venture.  There will be no need for a nonprofit or “low profits” enterprise to 
step in. 
23 Treas. Reg §53.4944-1(a)(2)(i). 
III. Program Related Investments 
 
A. In General 
 
Under IRC, § 4944(c), “investments, the primary purpose of which is to accomplish one 
or more of the [charitable] purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B),and no significant 
purpose of which is the production of income or the appreciation of property, shall not be 
considered as investments which jeopardize the carrying out of exempt purposes.”  In 
addition, a PRI counts toward a foundation's annual distribution requirement. Thus for a 
private foundation considering an investment in a for-profit entity, PRI status is 
invaluable.24 
 
The PRI regulations are specific in defining a PRI: 
 
 A program-related investment is an investment which possesses the 
following characteristics: 
        (i) The primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or 
more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) [charitable 
purposes]; 
        (ii) No significant purpose of the investment is the production of 
income or the appreciation of property; and 
        (iii) No purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or more of the 
purposes described in section170(c)(2)(D) [influence 
legislation/elections].25 
        
According to the regulations, the first PRI requirement is specific to the mission of the 
particular foundation seeking to make a PRI:   
 
An investment shall be considered as made primarily to accomplish one or 
more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) if it significantly 
furthers the accomplishment of the private foundation's exempt activities and 
if the investment would not have been made but for such relationship 
between the investment and the accomplishment of the foundation's exempt 
activities.26  
 
The second PRI requirement (“no significant purpose [to produce] income or … 
appreciation”0 authorizes high risk/low return investments in the proper circumstances.  
However, PRI status does not exempt a private foundation from the strictures on private 
benefit and the severe risks to any private foundation that runs afoul of those strictures. 
 
                                                          
24 A PRI is also a “qualifying distribution” as provided in Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2)(i) and therefore 
counts towards a private corporation’s annual required distribution amount under IRC § 4942. 
25 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1). 
26 Id. at § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i). 
In addition, PRI status does not override the requirement that any program related 
investment be mission specific.  The relevant mission is that of the private foundation.  
Thus, PRI analysis must always focus on the specific charitable purpose of the private 
foundation.  No state law designation can make a recipient organization generically 
qualified to receive PRIs or even categorically superior to other state law entity types. 
 
 
B. Expenditure Responsibility 
 
In addition to the requirements just described, a private foundation that makes a PRI must 
exercise “expenditure responsibility” so as to assure the recipient organization will 
properly use the invested charitable assets.27  “Expenditure responsibility” requires the 
foundation “to exert all reasonable efforts and to establish adequate procedures – (1) to 
see that the [PRI] is spent solely for the purpose for which made, (2) to obtain full and 
complete reports from the [recipient organization] on how the funds are spent, and (3) to 
make full and detailed reports with respect to such expenditures to the Secretary [of the 
Treasury].”28 Failure to exercise “expenditure responsibility” subjects the foundation and 
its managers to substantial excise taxes.29 
 
 
C. Potential Fiduciary Duties of Private Foundation to 
Recipient Organization and Organization’s Other Investors 
 
When a private foundation invests in a for-profit organization (even a low profit version), 
the foundation may become a part owner of that organization.30  If so, the foundation must 
consider what fiduciary or other duties it may have under the state entity law applicable to 
the recipient organization.  In general, fiduciary duty tends to follow power over other 
people’s investment, and under federal tax law a foundation making a PRI must have in 
place powerful constraints on the activities of the recipient organization.  By complying 
with federal tax law requirements, a foundation and its managers might find themselves 
exposed to state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty.31  This problem is not 
insurmountable, but – like so many matters that arise from co-mingling charitable assets 
                                                          
27 IRC § 4945(d)(4)(B).  The Code applies this requirement to “grants” but the regulations define “grants” to 
include “program related investments.”  Treas.Reg. § 53.4945-4(a)(2)  (stating that “[f]or purposes 
of section 4945, the term ‘grants’ shall include … ‘program related investments’”). 
28 IRC § 4945(h). 
29 IRC § 4945(a)-(b).  The Code defines “foundation manager” to mean “with respect to any private 
foundation—(1) an officer, director, or trustee of a foundation (or an individual having powers or 
responsibilities similar to those of officers, directors, or trustees of the foundation), and (2) with 
respect to any act (or failure to act), the employees of the foundation having authority or 
responsibility with respect to such act (or failure to act).” IRC § 4946(b). 
30 A foundation might also make a PRI in the form of a loan at a below-market interest rate.  See e.g. Treas. 
Reg. § 53.4944-3(b)(2) (example). 
31 For example, it requires considerable care to establish the proper balance between duties owed for-profit 
investors and need to avoid improper private benefit.  
with for-profit purposes – the problem requires sophisticated rather than simplistic 
analysis. 
 
 
D. General Effect of PRI Requirements, 
Expenditure Responsibility, Potential Fiduciary Duties, and the Risk of Private 
Benefit 
 
A private foundation contemplating a PRI must take into account the PRI requirements 
and expenditure responsibility, take note of potential fiduciary duties under the relevant 
state entity law, and pay very careful attention to any risk of private benefit.  This 
complex combination of requirements means that whenever a foundation seriously 
contemplates a PRI, the foundation must make a careful, fact-specific assessment of: (i) 
the connection between the foundation’s charitable purpose and the purposes of the 
proposed recipient; (ii) the structures in place in the recipient organization to assure the 
recipient’s continued commitment to the foundation’s charitable purpose and not merely 
to charitable purposes in general;32 (iii) how to balance the control mechanisms required 
by federal tax law against the risk of fiduciary duties under the applicable state entity law; 
and (iv) the potential of the investment producing private benefits that are not merely 
incidental to the foundation’s charitable purposes.33 
 
In short, a prudent PRI analysis cannot be quick, easy, label-driven, or “off the rack.” 
 
 
                                                          
32 This concern can also be addressed by providing that recipient will promptly return the PRI (i.e., buy out 
the private foundation’s ownership interest in the recipient) if the recipient deviates from the 
agreed-upon, foundation-specific charitable purpose. 
33 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(3)(i) (“Once it has been determined that an investment is “program-related” it 
shall not cease to qualify as a “program-related investment” provided that changes, if any, in the 
form or terms of the investment are made primarily for exempt purposes and not for any significant 
purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. A change made in the 
form or terms of a program-related investment for the prudent protection of the foundation's 
investment shall not ordinarily cause the investment to cease to qualify as program-related. Under 
certain conditions, a program-related investment may cease to be program-related because of a 
critical change in circumstances, as, for example, where it is serving an illegal purpose or the 
private purpose of the foundation or its managers.”) (emphasis added). 
E. PRIs and L3Cs 
 
The L3C structure does nothing to resolve the several serious issues pertaining to PRIs.  
Even assuming that L3C status were to guarantee that that each L3C would forever keep 
profit-making in the background,34 a private foundation contemplating a PRI must focus 
on its charitable purpose in particular and not benevolence in general.  Moreover, L3C 
status does nothing to address the “expenditure responsibility” issue.  With an L3C – just 
like an ordinary LLC – the operating agreement must be tailored to fit the state law entity 
into the federal tax law requirements. 
 
Likewise, L3C status does nothing to address the state law fiduciary duty questions and 
nothing to eliminate the specter of private benefit. 
 
As is often the situation with L3Cs, with regard to PRIs, L3Cs promise what they cannot 
deliver – simple solutions to inevitably complex problems. 
 
F. PRIs, L3Cs, and Tranched Investment 
 
Tranched investment further complicates the PRI-L3C connection.  As discussed above, 
tranched investment carries substantial risks of private benefit regardless of PRI status.  In 
addition, “top tranche” investors will naturally wish assurance that the L3C will keep their 
profit-making interests in mind.  As a result, establishing “expenditure responsibility” for 
the private foundation will be more complicated to devise and more difficult to achieve.  
For the related reasons the potential for fiduciary duty conflicts will increase (because if 
the L3C encounters financial difficulties the top tranche investors and the foundation will 
likely be pulling in opposite directions). 
 
Advocates of L3Cs often promote L3Cs as a break-through device that opens a 
streamlined channel from charitable assets to socially beneficial commercial ventures.  
To the contrary, the PRI-L3C connection inevitably requires painstaking analysis and 
planning, which must take into account sometimes contradictory legal requirements 
and potentially disastrous risk.35     
                                                          
34 As explained above, L3C status does not guarantee this result.  Nothing prevents those who control an 
L3C from deciding to abandon L3C status and the limitations that go with it.  Also as explained 
above, a properly crafted operating agreement can provide for this problem, but:  (i) such 
provisions require careful thought and drafting – i.e., they complicate matters; and (ii) are no 
simpler in an L3C than in an ordinary LLC.  
35 As discussed below, the same complexity and risk attend a PRI in any for-profit enterprise.  But such PRIs 
have been aggressively promoted only in connection with L3Cs. 
IV. Federal Tax Requirements and the L3C – Summary 
 
In to regard the myriad requirements of federal tax law, the L3C has no significant 
advantage whatsoever over the ordinary LLC.36  By itself, L3C legislation is entirely 
inadequate to satisfy the requirements of tax law.  State law cannot control federal tax law, 
and the L3C structure cannot streamline, simplify, or “green light” the PRI process. 
 
Tranched investing is extremely complex for a private foundation; a simplistic approach 
to private benefit will put a foundation’s tax exempt status in jeopardy.  In addition, 
tranched investing substantial complicated the already complicated analysis and planning 
necessary to qualify a private foundation as a PRI. 
 
In sum, from the perspective of federal tax law, the L3C is at best a distraction and 
more likely a simplistic trap for the unwary.   
 
 
V. Defects in the L3C Legislation 
 
A. The Misleading Implications of L3C Legislation 
 
1. In General 
 
When private foundations put charitable assets in the hands of for-profit entities, federal 
tax law is acutely, deeply, and inescapably involved.  The prohibition against private 
benefit is long-standing and fundamental public policy of the United States, and there is 
no reason to expect Congress to overturn that policy. The PRI focus on the private 
foundation’s purpose is similarly fundamental; to make recipient organizations generically 
qualified would turn the PRI concept “on its head.”   
 
State law cannot change the federal tax law, and enacting L3C legislation implicitly but 
inevitably promises benefits in an area of law over which the state has no control. That 
promise is the special evil of L3C legislation.  Statutes perform a signaling function.  They 
not only regulate; by their terms they suggest what behavior is acceptable.37 
 
                                                          
36 One of the country’s foremost experts on PRIs has stated: “I’ve structured, prepared documents for and 
closed over 250 PRIs (over $350 million total) of all forms, and never felt the need for an L3C.” 
(email, 7/14/11, from David S. Chernoff, Esq.) 
37 James J. Fishman, “Improving Charitable Accountability,” 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 248 (2003) (“the law 
occupies a signaling function of appropriate behavior”); Karen Gross, Kathryn R. Heidt, Lois R. 
Lupica, “Legislative Messaging and Bankruptcy Law,” 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 497, 499 (2006) 
(noting that “legislation performs a signaling function”); Alan Scott Rau, “Contracting Out of the 
Arbitration Act,” 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 225, 260, n. 147 (1997) (stating that “[a] particular 
statutory standard may have the signaling function of suggesting a standard that is common and 
socially approved”); Mark A. Drumbl, “Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of 
Law for the Women of Afghanistan,” 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 362 (2004) (“[L]aw 
sends a message, and expressive theories of law tell us that this signaling function is critical to the 
development of social norms.”); 
Especially in light of the claims of L3C advocates, statutory recognition of L3Cs suggests 
that an L3C is somehow a safer, easier, or otherwise superior type of recipient for a PRI.  
After all, why would the legislature create a specialized type of entity unless that entity 
type provided special benefits?   
 
More particularly, L3C legislation “hardwires” into a state statute restrictions that are 
intended to resonate with federal requirements for PRIs; the claimed compatibility 
between L3Cs and PRIs has been central to the advocacy for L3C legislation.  The 
obvious implication is that L3C legislation facilitates compliance with PRI requirements.  
Why would the legislature enact the L3C restrictions if those restrictions did not make 
compliance easier and simpler?  Thus, enacting L3C legislation signals that the L3C can 
increase and simplify access to PRIs through compliance with state rather than federal 
law. 
 
This implication is incorrect and misleading.  As noted above, in determining whether an 
investment qualifies as a PRI it is essential to ask whether the investment “significantly 
furthers the accomplishment of the private foundation's exempt activities and if the 
investment would not have been made but for such relationship between the investment 
and the accomplishment of the foundation's exempt activities.”38  Thus, the PRI analysis 
must always focus on the specific “exempt activities” of the foundation, which means that 
the private foundation must analyze each potential investment in terms of its suitability to 
the foundation’s mission. 
 
The PRI analysis must also consider carefully the governance structure of a potential PRI 
recipient, because a PRI investment always involves “expenditure responsibility.”  The 
recipient’s structure must therefore accord the private foundation sufficient control or exit 
rights (or a combination) to insure that foundation funds remain committed to acceptable 
purposes.  Devising such controls and exit rights is no simple matter, because the overall 
structure must also be acceptable to the profit-seeking investors and, moreover, protect the 
foundation from liability that might arise if the foundation were to exercise too much 
control over the recipient organization and trigger breach of fiduciary claims.   
 
A state-sponsored label for potential PRI recipients – L3C – suggests that PRI analysis is 
not only recipient-focused (“a PRI is safe with us because we’re an L3C”) and but also 
generic (“because we’re an L3C, we’re suitable for PRIs generally”).  The L3C label also 
suggests that the L3C structure “as is” resolves the very complex governance and financial 
issues inherent in any PRI.  The result is dangerous for private foundations, especially 
those that cannot afford expert legal advice.  
 
2. L3Cs and Tranched Investment 
 
The “signaling error” is even more egregious with regard to the tranched investment 
structured promoted by L3C advocates.  Although in theory any LLC could attempt to use 
a PRI for that type of tranched investing, in practice the danger is far greater under L3C 
legislation.  Since their first appearance, L3Cs have been associated with the potential of 
                                                          
38 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i). 
tranched investing.  Given that history, a state’s enactment of L3C legislation suggests 
that the state has recognized the L3C mechanism as safe and appropriate not only for PRIs 
in general but also for tranched investment in particular.  From the perspective of federal 
tax law, quite the opposite may be true – much to the harm of private foundations that 
may rely upon the apparent legislative endorsement. 
 
 
C. State Entity Law Not an Appropriate Method to Create a “Brand” 
to Identify Socially Beneficial Ventures 
 
From the outset, discussion of L3C legislation has included the notion that the L3C can 
serve as a “brand” to signal the socially beneficial quality of an enterprise to potential 
investors and customers.  Indeed, once federal tax law is understood, “branding” is all that 
remains in the pro-L3C argument.  But branding – as the term itself suggests – is a 
function for the private sphere.  Branding has never been the function of the law of 
business organizations, and a low profit limited liability company remains a business 
organization. 
 
Some L3C proponents have claimed that the L3C label is a proper “brand” because the 
L3C structure makes social benefit the primary purpose of the entity.  As previously 
noted, without appropriate language in the operating agreement, the L3C legislation 
cannot prevent an entity from abandoning social benefit through the simple mechanism of 
dropping the L3C label. 
 
Moreover, even in this context the “brand” is a misleading signal of simplicity.  Assuming 
that an L3C has members who expect some return on their investment, the operating 
agreement must address how the managers will balance the potentially competing 
interests.  According primacy to social benefit does not by itself adequately answer the 
balancing question.  With the tranched investment arrangement, the problem becomes 
extreme.  You cannot promise investors above-market rate returns and then assume that 
“primacy” resolves conflicts in every instance.  You can state in the operating agreement 
that in every instance the social benefit trumps the pecuniary interest, but: (i) the statutory 
language alone does not so provide; and (ii) the L3C will have to be very careful with its 
representations to the for-profit investors.   
 
More fundamentally, when it is important to brand business organizations regarding issues 
of social concern, advocates of social justice and well-intentioned businesses find 
powerful private means to create a brand.  Consider, for example, the Sullivan Principles, 
which established rigorous standards (enforced through public opinion) for companies 
dealing with apartheid South Africa.39  Consider currently the numerous private 
                                                          
39 http://muweb.marshall.edu/revleonsullivan/indexf.htm, last visited 6/9/11 (“When Leon Sullivan joined 
the Board of Directors at General Motors in 1971, he used his corporate foothold to oppose 
apartheid, the government policy of segregation in South Africa. Since the passage of a 
Declaration of Grand Apartheid in 1948, a number of reformers, including Nelson Mandela, had 
tried unsuccessfully to end apartheid.  
General Motors was the largest employer of blacks in South Africa at that time, and Sullivan decided to use 
his position on the Board of Directors to apply economic pressure to end the unjust system. The 
organizations that assess the “green” quality of products and services40 and the influence 
on businesses of the Halo Awards, the Gold Standard Certification of the Women in Law 
Empowerment Forum, and other such devices.41  State government is not needed to create 
branding for private enterprises; it is not the function of the law of business organizations 
to do so. 
 
 
D. The Technical Error in the L3C Legislation 
 
As noted above, House} File No. 2702 incorporates almost verbatim the wording of the 
federal PRI regulations.  In particular, in section 6, the bill provides that: “A significant 
purpose of a low-profit limited liability company must not include the production of 
income or the appreciation of  property.”42  Tranched investing cannot possibly work 
under this constraint.  In the L3C context, foundation funds are used to subsidize “top 
tranche” investors.  These investors seek at least a market rate of return; their investment 
is premised on the expectation of profit.  More generally, when “no significant purpose of 
the company is the production of income or the appreciation of property,” the label “low 
profit limited liability company” is a misnomer. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
result was the Sullivan Principles, which became the blueprint for ending apartheid.”).  Congress 
eventually incorporated the Principles into the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub.L. 
No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).  The Act “required American businesses with more than 25 
employees in South Africa to comply with the Sullivan Principles, a code of fair employment 
practices for companies operating in South Africa.”   Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement 
System of City of Baltimore v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720, 740 (Md. 
1989).  When apartheid ended, the requirement was repealed.  Pub.L. 103-149, § 4(a)(1), (2), Nov. 
23, 1993, 107 Stat. 1503.  However, the Sullivan Principles are still at work.  
http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/about/about_the_organization , last visited 6/9/11. (“We 
endeavor to bring the corporate and governmental communities together for the economic benefit 
of all, and invite businesses and individuals to create partnerships with Africa with our ultimate 
goal being a peaceful, prosperous, and powerful Africa.”). 
40 See e.g. “BMW Picks Up Three Honours at the Environmental Transport Association’s Green Car 
Awards 2010,” http://www.bmwblog.com/tag/environmental-transport-association%E2%80%99s-
green-car-awards-2010/ , last visited 6/12/11. 
41 http://www.causemarketingforum.com/site/c.bkLUKcOTLkK4E/b.6381267/k.BEDB/Home.htm; last 
visited 6/12/11; http://womenlawyerleaders.blogspot.com/, last visited 7/6/11. 
42 Minn. House File No. 2702, § 6, lines 5.20-5.22. 
E. No Need for an L3C Subcategory 
 
Under Minnesota’s existing LLC statute, it is already possible to create a low profit 
limited liability company.  Under Minn. Stat. § 322B.37, a member control agreement has 
complete authority to determine the LLC’s purpose, to allocate governance and financial 
rights differentially among members, and to protect the agreed structure from 
inappropriate revisions.43   L3C legislation adds nothing, and, as explained above, will 
cause the Minnesota to send inaccurate signals about the safety and effectiveness of L3Cs. 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Minn. Stat. § 322B.37 (2010).  A member control agreement under Minn.Stat. ch. 322B is equivalent to 
an operating agreement under other state LLC statutes. 
